I.

Overview
It is commonly noted that in the history of the Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) industry only two MMMFs have "broken the buck," or had the net asset value per share (NAV) at which they transact fall below $1. While this statement is true, it is useful to consider the role that non-contractual support has played in the maintenance of this strong track record. Such support, which has served to obscure the credit risk taken by these funds, has been a common occurrence over the history of MMMFs. This paper presents a detailed view of the non-contractual support provided to MMMFs by their sponsors 1 during the recent financial crisis based on an in depth review of public MMMF annual SEC financial statement filings (form N-CSR) with fiscal year-end dates falling between 2007 and 2011. According to our conservative interpretation of this data, we find that at least 21 prime MMMFs would have broken the buck absent a single identified support instance during the most recent financial crisis. 2 Further, we identify repeat instances of support (or significant outflows) for some MMMFs during this period such that a total of at least 31 prime MMMFs would have broken the buck when considering the entirety of support activity over the full period.
II. Background
On September 16, 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund (the "Reserve Fund") broke the buck due to its $785 million (1.2% of net assets) exposure to Lehman Brothers debt securities. This event served to remind investors that investments in MMMFs can in fact lose value. The Reserve Fund's losses also led to its closure and a prolonged liquidation process 3 -a significant cost for investors who value both preservation of principal and liquidity. Observing the fate of the Reserve Fund, investors began to exit other prime MMMFs (i.e., MMMFs that hold instruments such as commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and other forms of short term paper that carry credit risk) that might also have exposures to Lehman or to other issuers with a heightened risk of default or market value decline. 4 By exiting quickly, investors protected themselves not only from incurred losses yet to be recognized but also from liquidity strains arising from other investors choosing to redeem. These incentives to "run" were heightened by the lack of any cost or other penalty for redeeming an investment in a prime MMMF.
The run on prime MMMFs caused further disruption to already stressed short term corporate credit markets. Though many of the redemptions from prime MMMFs flowed into Treasury and Government MMMFs, and thus MMMF assets in aggregate fell less sharply than those of prime MMMFs, the Treasury and Government funds were not eligible to purchase many of the corporate issues that prime MMMFs were selling or ceasing to roll over. Unprecedented emergency facilities established by the Treasury and Federal Reserve ultimately slowed redemptions from prime MMMFs and helped maintain liquidity in the short term corporate funding markets.
The Reserve Fund was only the second MMMF to break the buck since the SEC adopted rules governing these funds in 1983, with the first being the Community Bankers US Government Fund in 1994. 6 Both funds had losses significant enough to cause them to break the buck and sponsors that were unable to provide non-contractual support to prevent the losses from being passed on to shareholders. However, it was the lack of sponsor support for these two funds that was more unusual than the underlying losses suffered, as credit events have impacted many more than two funds in the history of the MMMF industry. 7 The remainder of this paper discusses the credit losses suffered between 2007-2011 by MMMFs other than the Reserve Fund, and the related support provided by sponsors to offset these losses.
III. Description of Data and Methodology
Identifying and Quantifying Instances of Support
Figures 1 and 2 present information on support provided to prime MMMFs from fund sponsors in the form of a cash contribution (with no resulting benefit to the sponsor) or an outright purchase of distressed securities at above-market prices, collectively referred to hereafter as "direct support". In the case of a security purchase, the direct support amount is the difference between the purchase price and the estimated market value of the purchased security as disclosed in the MMMF's financial statement filing; it is not the full purchase price of the security.
While not considered here, purchase prices would be relevant in considering a sponsor's ability to support since a sponsor would need adequate liquidity for the purchase in addition to the ability to absorb related losses. Notably, the Credit Suisse Institutional Money Market Fund Inc. disclosed sponsor purchases in the amount of $5.69 billion during the year ended December 31, 2007. In December 2007, Janus Capital management purchased Stanfield Victoria Funding LLC positions from two Janus funds for over $100 million. Asserting that amortized cost approximated fair market value, neither MMMF disclosed any related losses or contributions from the sponsor, and accordingly, related support amounts are not included in our data set.
It is also important to note that our definition of support is narrow and excludes certain instances of sponsor intervention to protect MMMFs from losses. Specifically, direct support excludes support in the form of Capital Support Agreements (CSAs) and/or Letters of Credit (both of which provided guarantees on individual or a portfolio of securities) that were not drawn upon -even where such facilities were important in maintaining the market value NAVs of the funds. 8 Although such guarantees are an important form of support, placing a value on these agreements can be difficult and excluding them ensures that no support is double counted, since many guarantees later resulted in purchases of debt securities subsequent to their default. It also results in a lower reported frequency and value of support.
Figure 1 presents individual "instances" of support. Each financial statement period in which support was disclosed for a fund is considered an instance in Figure 1 The financial statements reviewed were subject to an independent audit and include disclosures specifically quantifying the value of the direct support. For security purchases, this disclosure includes the amount by which the purchase price exceeded fair market value (or the two figures necessary to calculate the difference), in all but one case. 11 Accordingly, full reliance was put on these disclosed figures when they were available, and assumptions regarding the fair value or the value of support were not necessary in these cases.
Previous work has explored or referenced instances of fund sponsor support including that of Baba et al. (2009) , Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012) , McCabe (2010) , and Moody's (2010). However, this paper is unique in presenting a complete data set of direct support instances and related amounts formed through a detailed review of the financial statements of all prime MMMFs. We observe that some past work has evaluated support by reviewing funds that received SEC no-action letters related to affiliate transactions. While a good general proxy for support, SEC no-action letter requests were not required for all forms of fund support 12 and the request for and issuance of a no-action letter does not obligate, in any way, the recipient(s) of a no-action letter to engage in the transaction(s) for which no-action relief was requested or granted. We identified 39 funds for which direct support was provided and a no-action letter was not requested. We also noted numerous funds for which a no-action request was made but no support was subsequently disclosed. By reviewing the financial statements, we obtain additional information on the nature and amount of support on an ex post basis. Finally, as previously noted, our data set focuses only on direct support to U.S. prime MMMFs and includes the review of SEC filings for an extended time period covering support events occurring as late as fiscal years ended October 31, 2011, which makes a comparison to other work that includes guarantees (which were not utilized) difficult.
Comparisons of Support Data to Asset Levels
This paper is the first to explore in detail the relationship of support provided to the size of the supported funds. Figures 1 and 2 Given all of these challenges, Figure 1 includes the highest AUM figure for each fund over the reporting year per both SEC annual and semiannual filings and voluntary filings by the fund with iMoneyNet, as applicable. Using the highest available AUM figures provides the most conservative view of the relative magnitude of each identified instance of direct support. For 28 instances covering 18 funds for which iMoneyNet data were not available, the AUM data on Figure 1 represent the highest of the beginning, semiannual, or ending AUM figures for the year when the support occurred, as disclosed in the SEC filings. For the remaining instances and funds, the AUM amount reported on Figure 1 is the highest of either these three figures or the daily assets reported by iMoneyNet. Figure 2 , which aggregates support by fund, presents the ending AUM figures for the last presented reporting period. This portrays the total loss amount for the fund over all periods relative to the ending AUM figures as if no fund support had been provided in any period and thus losses had accumulated in the fund. Accumulating the support amounts assumes that absent sponsor support, the fund would not have been able to recover any of the losses that prompted the support through an offsetting realized gain.
IV. Findings and Observations
The data suggest that during the period from 2007 to 2011, sponsor support was frequent and significant to many of the supported funds. Direct support alone totaled at least $4.4 billion, provided to at least 78 of the 341 funds reviewed. Support for these 78 funds occurred in 123 instances with 32 funds receiving support in multiple reporting periods.
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Drivers of Support
Support was largely driven by holdings of defaulted structured investment vehicles and Lehman obligations in 2007 and 2008. Figure 3 presents a list of defaulted securities referenced in at least one financial statement of the supported funds. Figure 4 presents the driver of support disclosed for the 21 funds with instances over 0.5% of AUM, as disclosed in the fund financial statement or in a related noaction letter. In some cases in the broader population of instances, the reason for support is not always specified in the financial statements beyond generic terms such as "due to realized losses of the fund", "to maintain the mark-to-market net asset value", or "to ensure the Fund maintained the highest credit rating possible."
It is important to note that MMMFs are still susceptible to risks related to portfolio holding downgrades or default, even subsequent to the 2010 SEC amendments to Rule 2a-7, promulgated under the Investment 
Timing of Support
Although the triggering market events occurred over the two years at the beginning of our review period, direct support continued in later years as well. In some of these instances, fund sponsors delayed direct support by putting in place multi-year guarantees. For example, the SDIT Prime Obligation Fund, which only shows support for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010, disclosed that on November 8, 2007 it entered into a CSA with SEI Investment Company providing that SEI would cover any losses realized on sales of securities that caused the mark to market NAV of the fund to fall below $0.9975. In other instances, sponsors allowed the fund NAVs to initially absorb small losses that were not large enough to cause the fund to break the buck, only to later provide support. Accordingly, many of the instances of support towards the end of the five year period reviewed were a small percentage of the funds' AUM. In these cases, it is likely that the fund support was motivated by the anticipation of enhanced SEC disclosure requirements, including monthly publication of the fund's market value NAV, or to avoid more burdensome compliance procedures mandated by the SEC for funds with market value NAVs below $0.9975. This was summarized well in the January 31, 2011, filing for the Wells Fargo MMMFs receiving support for that period:
"On November 29, 2010, the following Funds received contributions from Funds Management in order to support the mark-to-market net asset value of each Fund. This action was voluntary and was not necessary to maintain the $1.00 per share net asset value of these Funds at which shareholders transact, but was taken to address potential shareholder concerns due to regulatory changes that require all money market funds to make public their mark-to-market net asset values out to four decimal places."
Significance of Support
Many of the support instances observed over the full period are significant relative to the fund's NAV, and at least 21 funds received support exceeding 0.5% of the fund's AUM, an amount large enough to 14 Amendments to Rule 2a-7, adopted by the SEC in February 2010, include: reduced portfolio Weighted Average Maturity (WAM) limit (from 90 to 60 days); a new portfolio Weighted Average Life (WAL) limit of 120 days; enhanced portfolio disclosure requirements; periodic stress testing requirements; limits on second tier securities; daily (10%) and weekly (30%) liquidity requirements; suspension of redemptions; "Know Your Investor" procedures. ." While such a large exposure seems inconsistent with the 5% concentration limit of Rule 2a-7, it is important to note that such limits are only in effect at the time of purchase. In addition, this Fund experienced significant net redemptions 20 prior to the direct support action described above.
Prior to the direct support event, the sponsor provided a guarantee on the security, which represented 6.7% of the portfolio value at October 31, 2008.
V. Implications of Fund Support to the Sponsor
This paper does not make assertions about the significance of the support to the sponsor, but rather our focus is on the impact of support to prime MMMFs and its potential to cause investors to perceive that prime MMMF portfolios are less risky than they actually are. It should be noted that a support amount as reported in this paper is not necessarily equivalent to a loss realized by the fund sponsor. Instead, in the case of a security purchase, it is indicative of the loss that would have been realized by the fund sponsor if it had disposed of the security on the same day that the purchase was made from the fund. If the sponsor instead chose to hold the security, the actual loss suffered could have been greater or less depending on subsequent market movements or the terms of the ultimate settlement of the obligation by the issuer. Additionally, in the case of a direct contribution, a fund could later reimburse the sponsor in full or in part, as was the case for the Victory Institutional Money Market Fund noted in Footnote 13 above.
It is interesting to consider why a sponsor chooses to support a MMMF even though it is not contractually required to do so. Fund sponsors may be concerned about their reputation in the market place, loss of cross-selling opportunities, or the cost of potential investor lawsuits. 21 We posit that fund sponsors may also choose to provide support because they initially underestimate the amount of support necessary to fully alleviate financial concerns in the funds. While the entirety of support is costly, the incremental cost at each point may appear worthwhile.
Regardless of the motivation, sponsor behavior observed through these support instances suggests that while the costs can be significant, the perceived benefits at the time of support were greater to most fund sponsors. Understanding both the significance to the sponsor and their motivations would be important in making judgments as to whether investors should reasonably expect this model to continue, as it is possible that the sponsor value proposition could shift, especially where necessary support amounts are large.
VI. Conclusion
Investors in MMMFs choose these funds because of the stability and liquidity that they provide
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. This is precisely why these investors are prone to run during a financial crisis when either or both of these product features may be compromised. If investor losses resulted from market events more frequently, it is possible that the investor base and level of interest in the funds today would be very different. But, as this paper shows, such outcomes are not frequent, as even in times when market events would have caused losses to many investors, the voluntary actions of sponsors has negated this impact.
It is unclear whether MMMFs, as currently structured, are really pass-through entities. Fund investors see no fluctuations in their share values based on changing interest rates or credit spreads. When fund losses materialize, it is usually the sponsors rather than investors who absorb them. And in the only recent example of investors being required to absorb a loss, a run was triggered on other funds that may have significantly impacted the broader economy absent government intervention.
If sponsor support were explicitly required and planned for, and all sponsors had the consistent ability to provide support, such a business model might not be viewed as problematic. But the current model is concerning in that it reinforces investor confidence in the stability of the product without the ability of all sponsors to consistently deliver. (1) iMoneyNet data unavailable or incomplete for this fund for this period.
(2) This support amount includes $21,755,102 disclosed as a capital contribution. Also included is the authors' estimate of the difference between the purchase price and market value of purchases of defaulted securities for $1,249 million for which no market value was disclosed. The estimated excess of the purchase price over fair market value is based on the change in the value of the Capital Support Agreement, which was $599. (1) Total includes an estimate of the difference between the purchase price and market value of purchases of defaulted securities during the 2010 fiscal year for $1,249 million for which no market value was disclosed. The estimated excess of the purchase price over fair market value is based on the change in the value of the Capital Support Agreement, which was $599. 
